A coup that changed the course of history

On January 15, 1966, the first military coup, led by Major Chukwuemeka Nzeogwu changed the course of Nigerian history. Group Political Editor EMMANUEL OLADESU revisits the aborted journey to democratic stability, barely six years after independence, which set the stage for the enthronement of unitary system by ‘sit-tight,’ adventurous military rulers. 

The joy of independence from the British only lasted for six years. On January 15, 1966, blood thirsty military reformers were on the prowl. Led by Major Chukwuemeka Nzeogwu, the coup drew the curtains on the First Republic. The gains of the nationalist movement were reversed. Up came military rulers who plunged the country into an unmitigated disaster of bad governance. Fifty one years after, the country has not fully recovered from the misadventure.

The coup, as pointed out by an eminent political scientist, Prof. Isawa Elaigwu, had an ethnic colouration. Four of the five planners were Igbo. The principal victims were Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Uhrobo. While Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Northern Regional Premier Sir Ahmadu Bello, Western Regional Premier Ladoke Akintola and Finance Minister Chief Festus Okoti-Eboh fell by the bullets, those who carried out operations in the Midwest and Eastern regions spared the lives of their two Igbo targets-Premiers Dennis Osadebey and Michael Okpara. The ceremonial president, Dr. Nnamidi Azikiwe from Igboland, was on medical leave abroad.

The ethnic distribution of casualties among the military officers was also skewed. Those killed by the mutineers included Brigadier Zachariya Maimalari, Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, Commander of the First Brigade, Kaduna, Brigadier Largema,  Kur Mohammed, James Pam, Arthur Nnegbe, and Col. Ralph Sodeinde. The discriminating killings unleashed a feeling of ethnicity, which became more intense as the major beneficiary of the coup, the General officer Commanding the Armed Forces, Major Gen. Thomas Aguiyi Ironsi, also an Igbo, took measures that also had ethnic colouration, thereby inadvertently convincing the aggrieved northerners that the change of government was carried out as punishment for northern domination.

The coup plotters were easily edged out and their vision died with them in detention. The military Head of State suddenly found himself in the corridor of power, unprepared for the responsibility of nation-building. He lacked a programme of action; his competence was in doubt. On coup day, he was full of bravado as he harassed the surviving ministers to hurriedly hand over the reins to him at gun point because the Igbo Acting President, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, was reluctant to appoint either Alhaji Bukar Dipcharima or Dr. Ozumba Mbadiwe as acting prime minister. Yet, he was slow in taking decisive action against the murderers of the civilian and military leaders, thereby aggravating the tension.

Discipline broke down in the military. Unable to bring the mutineers to justice, soldiers of northern extraction continued to grumbled. Ironsi was in a dilemma. Having hailed the coup as a revolution, Southern intellectuals justified the putsch, unmindful of the perception of Northerners who believed that the plot was hatched to effect power shift from the North to Igboland.

The Commander-In-Chief also surrounded himself with his kith and kin, thereby failing to become a symbol of unity at the critical time. Ironsi further plunged the country into anxiety by sacking the federal structure and foisting on Nigeria a unitary system through his Decree No 34, 1966. “Nigeria shall cease to be a federation and shall accordingly be a republic,” he said. The regions were abolished, only to be replaced by territorial areas called provinces. . Up came a National Military Government in place of the Federal Military Government. In his view, the key to national unity was the abolition of regionalism.

More disgusting was the unification of the civil service, which was antithetical to the reality of the country’s diversity in terms of language, culture and regional peculiarities. Ironsi failed to set up a cabinet. The suspicion among diverse soldiers in the barracks grew and aggrieved northern officers started plotting for the revenge of the killings of their past leaders.

To douse the tension, Ironsi embarked on the tour of the country. His targets for dousing the tension were traditional rulers, the politicians having been discredited by the military. But, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon, had the duty of explaining the political situation to the military. After his tour of the North, he went to Ibadan, the capital of Western State, to address the traditional rulers at the Western Regional House of Chiefs. But, at the state dinner organised by his host, Governor Adekunle Fajuyi, the Northern officers passed the code word ’Araba’ among themselves. On July 29, 1966, the soldiers, led by Major Yakubu Danjuma and Lt. Walbe kidnapped the visitor and the host. They never returned alive.

The military had boxed the country into a succession crisis. Ironsi’s deputy, Brigadier         Babafemi Ogundipe, Chief of Staff, decided to call a special session of senior army officers in Lagos. But, to his consternation, a northern Sergeant refused to take  orders from him. Sensing danger, he vanished into thin air, only to resurfaced in London as High Commissioner to Britain after Gowon assumed leadership. But, there was an obstacle. While the military governors of the North, West and Midwest-Lt. Cols. Hassan Katsina, Adeyinka Adebayo and David Ejoor-accepted the leadership of Gowon, their counterpart in the East, Lt-Col. Chukwuemeka Odimegwu-Ojukwu raise objection. He urged Ogundipe to insist on taking command.

Gowon succeeded in dousing the push for succession by Northern officers. But, Ojukwu was adamant that the military hierarchical order should be preserved. When power shifted to the North, the government had to contend with restiveness in the North. In what has been described as pogrom, many officers and civilians of Igbo origin were murdered in the North. To halt the trend, Ojukwu advised the Igbos in the hostile region to return home.

Gen. Gowon was not insensitive to the cloud of uncertainty hovering over the country. He set up an Ad hoc Constitution Conference in Lagos in September 12, 1966. He attempted to outlaw the unitary system, saying: “a country as big as Nigeria and comprising such diversity of tribes and cultures cannot be administered successfully under a unitary form of government, unless such a government is to be enforced and maintained by some kind of dictatorship.” Delegates to the conference oscillated between confederation and federal system. Delegates from Lagos, led by former Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Dr. Olawale Elias, called for creation of states. The pre-conference deliberations restore peace and harmony in the North, West and Midwest.

However, the gulf between Gowon and Ojukwu had become widened. Although a lot of concessions were made to him in the Aburi Accord, the governor of Eastern Region still opted for secession on May 30, 1967. Gowon promptly declared a state of emergency in the country. He also created new state s and appointed new military governors. Reflecting on the restructuring, Elaigwu said:  “Ojukwu was now on the defensive; he had to react to Gowon’s political moves on Nigeria’s chess board.”   Later, the Hed of State appointed civilian ministers to stabilise his government.

The civil war lasted for three years. There were heavy casualties on both federal and Biafran sides. In 1970, Col. Philip Effiong led the rebel forces to surrender. Then, the Federal Government started to confront the challenges of reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. Contrary to his promise to organize a transfer of power to the civilians, Gowon postponed the transition programme. He was ousted from power in 1975.

His successor, the late Gen. Muritala Mohammed set up a transition programme. Although he was assassinated on February 13, 1976, the programme was not truncated. It was completed by his successor, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo in 1979 after 13 years of military rule.

But, coup plotting had become the latent career of ambitious soldiers. Thus, the military sacked the Shagari administration, barely four years after. The Head of State, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, was also shoved aside by his Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985. Babangida who spent eight year in office, and promised to relinquish power annulled the most credible presidential election won by the late Chief Moshood Abiola of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP). The interim regime of Ernest Shonekan that succeeded him was sacked by Gen.Abacha. In 1998, Abacha died in office and Gen. Abudulsalami Abubakar came to office. He handed over to Chief Obsanjo as president.

On getting to power, the military embraced the attitude of self-enrichment. Corruption became a state policy. Also, under the successive military governments, Nigeria regressed to the unitary system. The legacies have not been wiped out by political stability in the last 19 years of the Fourth Republic.

 

 

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